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Abstract 
This paper investigates whether gender-diverse boards can play a role in preventing costly 
bank misconduct episodes. We exploit the fines received by European banks from US 
regulators to reduce endogeneity issues related to supervisory and governance mechanisms. 
We show that greater female representation significantly reduces the frequency of 
misconduct fines, equivalent to savings of $7.48 million per year. Female directors are more 
influential if they reach a critical mass and are supported by women in leadership roles. The 
mechanism through which gender diversity affects board effectiveness in preventing 
misconduct stems from the ethicality and risk aversion of the female directors, rather than 
their contribution to diversity. The findings are robust to alternative model specifications, 
proxies for gender diversity, reverse causality, country and bank controls, and sub-sample 
analyses.  
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Preventing bank misconduct is a top priority for international regulators and policymakers. In the 
years following the 2007-08 financial crisis, a larger than ever number of scandals and fraud episodes 
led to an unprecedented number of fines, globally. The world's largest banks were hit with misconduct 
fines amounting to £264 billion between 2012 and 2016.2 These misconduct episodes represent a 
threat not only to the soundness of individual financial institutions, as the fines associated with these 
investigations are high (in many cases exceeding $1 billion), but they also represent a cost to society, 
harm financial stability, and decrease trust in the financial sector.  
In this paper, we investigate the impact of board gender diversity on bank misconduct. Misconduct is 
typically associated with the wilful or intentional disregard of laws, ethics or internal governance and 
controls (ESRB, 2015). It can be linked to the violation of specific banking rules (for example, 
misselling of financial products) or the violation of general rules (for example, tax violations) and 
regulations related to the inappropriate supply of financial services (for example, anti-money 
laundering rules and economic sanctions). Misconduct issues frequently arise across markets and, 
correspondingly, occur more often in systemically important cross-border banks. 
Misconduct episodes are often strictly intertwined with governance failures. Regulators have 
responded to the shortcomings of the existing bank governance structures with a series of initiatives 
aimed at reinforcing internal controls. Most of these proposals, from best practice guidelines to 
regulatory reforms, have placed an emphasis on increased diversity. In particular, regulators have 
focused on enhancing the gender diversity of the board of directors. The underlying idea is that the 
tone at the top shapes a firm’s conduct and ethical climate and that more diverse boards, with an 
increased presence of women, would positively affect the governance of companies (Fields and Keys, 
2003; Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; Campbell and Minguez-Vera, 2008; Algan et al., 2016).  
                                                          
2 Conduct Cost Project (CCP) Research Foundation (2017). Available at: 
http://conductcosts.ccpresearchfoundation.com 
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There is a growing body of literature analysing whether corporate outcomes can be positively 
influenced by increased gender diversity in the boardroom and examining the governance 
mechanisms to achieve these potential benefits (Adams and Funk, 2009; Adams and Ferreira, 2009; 
Ahern and Dittmar, 2012; Liu et al., 2015). In this paper, we hypothesise that higher board gender 
diversity is associated with lower misconduct, proxied by the number of fines issued by US regulators 
to EU listed banks during 2007-18. We examine the post-crisis period, as regulators’ attention 
increasingly focused on curbing risk-taking and potentially illegal practices. During this period, the 
activism of US regulators on European banks was exceptional both in reach and severity of fines. We 
aim to provide evidence on whether gender diversity, as a standalone feature or along other 
dimensions of diversity, increases board monitoring effectiveness and thus its ability to reduce 
conduct risk.   
Establishing a causal relationship between board diversity and bank misconduct is challenging. In 
terms of identification, one of the main issues is the regulatory capture problem (Stigler, 1971), 
whereby regulatory agencies might be vulnerable to capture and thus less impartial and objective in 
imposing sanctions on domestic banks because of political connections, lobbying activities, or 
concerns about the financial stability of the domestic banking system. To address this issue, we focus 
on the sanctions imposed by US regulatory bodies on European listed banks. We exploit the fact that 
US regulators can impose fines not only on banks operating in the US, but their authority extends to 
all transactions which pass through the US financial system, including all US dollar-based 
transactions, both to US and non-US persons, entities, and institutions.3 As such, US sanctions are 
considered extraterritorial.4 To the extent that board members of our sample of European listed banks 
have no or weak influence on the outcome of US regulatory bodies’ investigations, our empirical set 
up allows us to mitigate regulatory capture bias. US regulators have hit foreign financial institutions 
particularly hard over the last 10 years. Post-crisis, European banks have been fined four times more 
                                                          
3 https://www.theglobaltreasurer.com/2018/10/18/sanctions-overview-eu-and-us-loan-markets/ 
4 Recently, OFAC has targeted transactions conducted in US dollars even if they involve only non-US 
entities. For example, CSE, a telecom company from Singapore, was fined $12 million for providing goods and 
services to Iranian energy projects. The dollar clearing process allows OFAC to claim US jurisdiction. See for 
the fine https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/CivPen/Documents/20170727_transtel.pdf and for 
the settlement https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/CivPen/Documents/transtel_settlement.pdf. 
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than their US counterparts, representing 77 per cent of the total of all fines levied by US regulators 
since 2008 (Fenergo, 2018). Sanctions from US regulators have a more international echo and thus 
carry higher reputational risk. Furthermore, on average, US authorities impose larger financial 
penalties which can have a stronger impact on sanctioned banks’ performance. Therefore, we expect a 
bank’s board of directors to be particularly concerned about misconduct fines originating from the US 
and, more importantly, we expect the board to be more aware and active in monitoring potential 
sources of conduct risk.  
Another challenge relates to the fact that board characteristics are not exogenous random variables but 
are endogenously chosen by firms (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; Adams and Ferreira, 2007; Sila et 
al., 2016). Two sources of endogeneity are potentially likely to bias our estimates of how board 
diversity affects bank misconduct: omitted variable bias and reverse causality. To address potential 
endogeneity caused by omitted variable bias, we use bank-level controls (for example, total assets, as 
larger banks may have more diverse boards). We also use country-level controls and regulatory 
agency fixed effects to account for unobserved country-specific and business model-specific 
characteristics that remain constant over time and might be correlated with misconduct. Reverse 
causality may arise as the direction of the causal relation is unclear ex-ante. Female directors can self-
select into a particular type of bank, either a more ethical or a less risky bank whose existing 
management is more aligned with their views. On the other hand, riskier banks may choose to appoint 
more women in a bid to reverse past problems (Ryan and Haslam 2005). In our context, the above 
issues would imply that current boardroom diversity could be determined by past misconduct. To 
account for these possible endogeneity issues, we use lagged values of the regressors and control for 
both the number and the dollar amount of previous misconduct fines. 
We start by documenting differences in bank board composition for our sample of listed European 
banks. We find great heterogeneity in board size, tenure, age, and CEO characteristics. While we 
show an increase in female representation in bank boardrooms during our sample period, the industry 
remains heavily male-dominated and there are still bank boards with no female directors. Women in 
leadership positions including the CEO and chairperson roles are even less common. 
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In our empirical analysis, we employ the negative binomial model to relate the frequency of 
misconduct fines to board gender diversity using the fraction of female directors as the key 
explanatory variable. We find that a greater presence of women on the board of directors is associated 
with fewer misconduct fines and the effect is economically significant. For the average change in the 
fraction of women in our sample, the number of fines decreases by a fraction of 0.27, ceteris paribus. 
The estimated decrease in the frequency of banks’ misconduct fines as a result of greater gender 
diversity is equivalent to saving approximately $7.48 million per year. Additional analyses reveal that 
female directors tend to be more influential if they reach a critical mass, are supported by women in 
leadership roles (CEO and/or chairperson) and hold seats on boards of relatively smaller banks.   
To test the predictions of the gender socialisation theory, that is, whether ethicality/risk aversion are 
the channels through which a greater female presence on banks’ boards reduces incidences of 
misconduct, we distinguish among different types of fines according to the severity of the underlying 
offence. First, we distinguish between civil and criminal fines.5 We argue that criminal fines are more 
severe as they carry a higher professional and societal stigma; they are, on average, larger in amount 
and thus more harmful to the stakeholders of the bank. We find that a change in the proportion of 
female directors on the board is negatively (albeit weakly) associated with the incidence of criminal 
fines, thus providing some support to the gender socialisation theory. Next, we distinguish among 
different types of fines based on the underlying misconduct and proxy their severity by stock price 
reactions to the fine announcement. We define the following four categories of fines: (i) banking 
violations, which comprises misconduct fines banks incur in relation to their core banking business, 
including anti-money laundering; (ii) economic sanctions violations; (iii) market violations, and (iv) 
administrative violations, including tax violations and accounting deficiencies. Following a standard 
event study methodology, we find that share price reactions are more severe for economic sanctions 
compared to the other type of fines. This is consistent with the fact that economic sanctions tend to be 
                                                          
5 Most US states recognise two types of offences - crimes and civil infractions. Crimes are a matter of 
criminal law and usually punishable by either time in jail or a fine, or both; civil infractions are generally 
punishable only by fines or administrative actions. A civil fine is a penalty for an offence not as serious as to be 
stipulated as a crime. Non-payment of a criminal fine can result in incarceration, whereas non-payment of a civil 
penalty cannot. 
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related to exceptional events, attract more media attention, and carry a higher reputational risk. A 
breakdown of the regression analysis into the different types of fines reveals that an increase in the 
proportion of women on the board is associated with a lower frequency of economic sanction 
violations, thereby providing further support to the existence of an ethicality / risk aversion channel as 
a mechanism through which board gender diversity helps reducing misconduct. 
Finally, we investigate whether it is diversity in general, and not specifically gender diversity, which 
reduces misconduct. The human capital theory posits that by widening the range of directors’ skills, 
abilities, managerial approaches and preferences, board diversity is expected to yield benefits in terms 
of monitoring effectiveness. However, these potential benefits are not without costs, as conflicts may 
arise in more diverse boards, leading to more unpredictable decision making (Giannetti and Zhao, 
2018). In line with the human capital theory, we expect other aspects of diversity, including age 
diversity, internationalisation, and employee representation, to have a misconduct-reducing impact.6 
Our results show that while the preventive effect of female directors holds even in the presence of 
other dimensions of diversity, the impact of other types of board diversity on misconduct is not 
significant. 
Our analysis is robust to using a Poisson model for the frequency of misconduct, a probit specification 
for the binary dependent variable of the incidence of fines, alternative proxies for gender diversity 
such as change in the fraction of women, and the use of country fixed effects instead of country 
controls. The impact of female directors is also analysed across different bank size groups and the 
findings suggest that they are most relevant for relatively smaller banks. Taken together, our findings 
provide support to the recent policy initiatives to support increased gender equality in traditionally 
male-dominated industries such as the banking sector. 
Our paper contributes to the current literature and policy debate in several respects. First, our work is 
related to the literature that analyses the relationship between governance and risk in the banking 
                                                          
6 Our choice of diversity indicators includes all the aspects suggested by recent regulatory guidelines (EBA, 
2017), with the exception of educational and professional background due to data limitation. We use employee 
representation as a proxy of professional background and experience. The EBA (2017) document posits that 
employee representation in the boardroom could be seen as enhancing diversity, as it adds a different 
perspective and knowledge of the internal workings of companies. 
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industry (Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013; Nguyen et al., 2016). We contribute to 
the understanding of the determinants of bank conduct risk. Misconduct represents a cost to society, 
as banks subsequently incur severe financial and reputational penalties that in turn may hinder their 
ability to provide financial services. We also derive insights into the channels through which the 
preventive benefits of female participation materialise. In this respect, our results provide support to 
the role of women in strengthening the board’s ability to address reputation and conduct risks. Our 
work also relates to the literature on board diversity and firm performance (Ahern and Dittmar, 2012; 
Liu et al., 2014; Giannetti and Zhao, 2018). The quality of a board’s decision-making is likely to 
depend on the qualities and attributes of the directors, but also on the interaction between directors’ 
characteristics (Cumming et al., 2015; Giannetti and Zhao, 2018). We contribute to this literature by 
disentangling the ethicality / risk aversion and the diversity hypotheses. More in general, we 
contribute to the debate on the role of women in leadership positions in the banking industry. Progress 
towards gender equality has been notoriously slow, despite the recent regulatory drive to increase 
diversity and to improve the participation of women and minorities in high profile roles. Recent 
evidence highlights that, globally, women hold less than 20 per cent of board seats of banks (Sahay 
and Cihak, 2018). Finally, our paper is related to the literature on the effect of sanctions and 
regulatory behaviour on bank risk (Ioannidou, 2005; Agarawal et al. 2014; Nguyen et al., 2016; Delis, 
2017), the cost and availability of credit (Danisewicz et al., 2018; Deli et al., 2019).  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a review of the literature and 
hypotheses development. Section 3 discusses the data and univariate analysis. Section 4 presents the 
results of our main analysis and a set of robustness checks. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Literature and hypotheses development 
2.1 Women on boards 
In recent years there have been several high-profile campaigns aiming to increase female 
representation on companies’ boards of directors. Examples include the 2020 Women on Boards 
(2020WOB) in the US and the Hampton-Alexander Review in the UK. The report for the 2020WOB 
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shows that the average number of board seats held by women in companies listed in the Russell 3000 
Index has risen to 17.7 per cent in 2018, up from 16 per cent in 2016; however, half the companies in 
the index have one or no women on their boards. In particular, smaller companies are less diverse, 
with 13 per cent of female directors versus 25.3 per cent in the largest companies.7 The Hampton-
Alexander Review also reports an increase in the proportion of women on boards of FTSE100: it 
reached 30.2 per cent in 2018, up from 27.7 per cent in 2017. However, the number of women in 
leadership positions (CEO or chairperson) has scarcely changed in recent years and a large number of 
companies have only one woman on the board.8 This clearly shows that while some progress has been 
achieved, there is still a long way to attaining gender balance in corporate governance. The issue is 
even more relevant in the finance and banking industries, which are traditionally male-dominated.  
Gender diversity is important not only from a societal point of view but also in terms of corporate 
performance. Boards of directors make decisions that impact all stakeholders, from employees to 
shareholders and customers. The relationship between board gender diversity and corporate 
performance is usually explained by agency theory (gender diversity improves the board monitoring 
function), by the human capital theory (gender diversity improves the board skills and expertise), and 
by behavioural-based theories, such as the gender socialisation theory (gender diversity improves the 
board monitoring role as women are more stakeholder-oriented).  
With reference to agency theory, there is evidence that increased gender diversity in the boardroom 
can positively influence corporate outcomes in relation to key board functions, such as attendance, 
quality of discussions, and monitoring effectiveness including a better oversight of firm’s disclosures 
and reports (Carter et al., 2003; Field and Keys, 2003; Terjesen et al. 2009; Adams and Ferreira, 2009; 
Gul et al., 2011). However, studies on the effects of board gender diversity on firm performance have 
produced mixed results (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Adams and Funk, 2012; Ahern and Dittmar, 
2012; Mateos de Cabo et al., 2012; Bennouri et al., 2018). Post and Byron (2015) provide an 
extensive review of the literature and conclude that the results are influenced by cultural norms and 
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regulatory environments. More recently, Ye et al. (2019) document a positive and significant 
relationship between gender-diverse boards and the likelihood and the level of dividend pay-outs, 
which is consistent with the view that board gender diversity encourages effective corporate 
governance, thereby alleviating agency problems.  
Based on the predictions on this strand of the literature, we derive our first testable hypothesis as 
follows: 
Hypothesis 1 (Agency theory): Higher gender diversity of bank boards is associated with a lower 
number of misconduct fines. 
2.2 Gender, risk aversion, and ethicality 
There are many potential benefits to having a larger presence of female directors. The earlier literature 
finds that women are, on average, more risk-averse and less overconfident (Jianakoplos and Bernasek, 
1998; Schubert et al., 1999; Croson and Gneezy, 2009, Price, 2012), although Sapienza et al. (2009) 
find that women who work in the financial industry tend to be less risk-averse compared to women in 
other industries. Women also bring enhanced corporate social responsibility and a more ethical 
perspective (Bryon and Post, 2016; McGuinnes et al., 2017). Richardson et al. (2016) find that more 
gender-diverse boards are associated with lower tax avoidance, whereas Garcia-Lara et al. (2017) 
document fewer incidences of account misreporting in firms with a higher percentage of female 
directors. Cumming et al. (2015) investigate the effect of board gender diversity on security fraud and 
find that it reduces both the frequency and the severity of fraud. Similarly, Liu (2018) investigates the 
relationship between board gender diversity and corporate environmental violations and finds that 
firms with more gender-diverse boards receive fewer environmental sanctions. Finally, female 
directors are found to be more stakeholder-oriented (Adams et al., 2011; Matsa and Miller, 2013) and 
less likely to pursue personal goals such as empire building through acquisitions (Levi et al., 2014). 
Based on the predictions of the gender socialisation theory, which posits that males and females are 
taught different appropriate behaviours, we expect female directors to be less inclined to commit 
misconduct. This might be a consequence of the fact that women are generally raised to be more 
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caring, compassionate, and attentive to others’ needs. In our context, this would translate in greater 
attention to stakeholders’ needs, including depositors, investors, and employees (Ethicality channel).  
On the other hand, gender might help explain differences in preferences and attitudes; for example, 
differences in sensitivity to social cues in determining appropriate behaviour (Croson and Gneezy, 
2009; Alesina et al., 2013DellaVigna et al., 2013). One explanation for these behavioural differences 
is unequal discipline, that is, female employees responsible for missteps are subject to stricter 
penalties than their male counterparts. Egan et al. (2018) examine gender differences in misconduct 
punishment in the financial advisory industry and find evidence of a gender punishment gap. Against 
the background of a male-dominated industry, where male advisors engage in more severe 
misconduct both in terms of allegations and subsequent fines, the authors document that following an 
incident of misconduct, female advisers are 20 per cent more likely to lose their jobs and 30 per cent 
less likely to find new jobs relative to male advisers. We can argue gender roles and cultural norms 
may also mean that misconduct is more highly penalised for women and therefore less likely (Risk 
aversion channel). 
However, untangling the mechanism through which the presence of women on boards of directors 
affects misconduct is challenging as differences in ethical sensitivity and risk aversion may overlap. 
To investigate the link between gender, ethical behaviour, and risk aversion, we consider the severity 
of the underlying misconduct. First, we distinguish between civil and criminal fines.  The underlying 
assumption is that criminal fines are more severe as they carry a higher professional and societal 
stigma. In addition, they are, on average, larger and thus more harmful to the stakeholders of the bank. 
We argue that the impact of gender diversity should be stronger for criminal fines as female directors 
might exert greater monitoring and closer oversight of board decisions to avoid more severe offences. 
Second, we distinguish four broad categories of fines, according to the type of the underlying 
misconduct. Our first category, banking business, comprises misconduct fines banks incur in relation 
to their core banking business, including anti-money laundering. The next set includes fines for the 
breach of economic sanctions. Our third category relates to market violations, and our final category 
relates to administrative violations, including tax violations and accounting deficiencies. We proxy the 
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severity of the different types of misconduct by stock price reactions to the fine announcement. We 
argue that if women are simply more ethical, then their misconduct-reducing effect should be similar 
for fines of different types. On the other hand, if risk aversion is also at play, we would expect the 
effect to be stronger for more severe fines as these are more harmful to the bank’s shareholders and 
carry a higher reputational risk to board members. 
We formulate our second hypothesis as follows: 
Hypothesis 2 (Risk aversion / Ethicality channel): Higher gender diversity of bank boards is 
associated with a lower number of severe misconduct fines. 
2.3 Gender and diversity 
The potential benefits of having more female directors could be due to the general diversity that they 
bring to the board, so that the diversity in general is a potential mechanism of preventing bank 
misconduct. The key argument to support diversity, in line with the human capital theory, is that a 
more diverse management team tends to be more innovative and creative, more open to different 
ideas, and willing to consider a broader range of alternatives. The literature also provides some 
support for the human capital theory, as female directors are likely to have different views and 
therefore innovative ideas (Robinson and Dechant, 1997) and a broader set of skills in terms of 
educational and professional backgrounds, leading to better decision-making (Anderson et al., 2011). 
In addition, more diverse boards should be harder to manipulate. Arnaboldi et al. (2018) investigate 
whether board heterogeneity impacts on bank performance and find evidence to support the argument 
that diversity in board composition relates to different aspects in addition to gender, including age 
diversity (Carter et al, 2010; Li and Wahid, 2017); internationalisation (Adams and Ferreira, 2012; 
Oxelheim, 2013; Fahlenbrach et al., 2017), and employee representation (Adams and Ferreira, 2007). 
The literature on the impact of board diversity on firm performance yields mixed results. Giannetti 
and Zhao (2018) argue that board effectiveness is likely to depend not only on the characteristics of 
the directors but also on the interaction between the directors. While diverse groups might be better at 
problem-solving, there might also be more disagreements. Consistently, they find that diverse boards 
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have more numerous and cited patents, but also have more frequent board meetings and make less 
predictable decisions, which increases firm performance volatility. 
If it is diversity that matters, rather than the presence of female directors per se, we would expect 
other diversity features, as well as gender diversity, to be associated with a lower number of fines. 
This would be in line with the view that women are not different from men in leadership positions or 
at managing risks and that more diverse boards perform better simply because of the benefits of a 
multiplicity of views and skills (Nelson, 2014).  
We test the diversity channel and formulate the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3 (Diversity channel): Higher diversity – not gender diversity per se - is associated with a 
lower number of fines. 
3. Data and methodology 
3.1. Data and sample selection 
Our data set is compiled from several sources. We start by collecting data on corporate governance 
features of all publicly listed banks in the 28 EU countries for the period 2007-18 from BoardEx. 
Where the BoardEx data are not complete, information on board members is sourced from Bloomberg 
and individual banks’ annual reports. Next, we augment the BoardEx data with the banks’ balance 
sheet and income statement data collected from Orbis Bank Focus and stock market data from 
Thomson Eikon. At this stage, we remove bank-years with missing board size or total assets data and 
exclude banks with less than three observations over the sample period. This yields a final sample of 
83 publicly listed banks operating in 21 EU countries over the period 2007-18, which covers 72 per 
cent of the total assets of these countries’ banking systems at the end of the sample period.  
We then collect data on fines imposed on our sample banks by US regulatory agencies during the 
period 2009-2018 from Violation Tracker.9 We retrieve all sanction cases, and cross-check each 
sanction against the information available on the websites of the corresponding regulatory agencies 
                                                          
9 Violation Tracker is a publicly available search engine on corporate misconduct. It covers cases initiated by 
more than 40 federal regulatory agencies and all divisions of the Justice Department since 2000.  
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and their press releases, which yields a number of sanctions in addition to those reported on Violation 
Tracker. The sanctions data include the type of sanction, the fine amount, the fine date, a short 
description of the offense, an indication of whether the sanction is civil or criminal, and the 
sanctioning regulatory body. The sanctions contain, among others, charges for banking violations, 
anti-money laundering practices, economic sanction violations, market manipulations, investor and 
consumer protection violations, tax violations, accounting and data submission deficiencies, and 
employment discrimination. The sanctioning regulatory bodies include both the US bank regulators 
(that is, Federal Reserve, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, and Consumer Financial Protection Bureau) and securities markets regulator (Securities 
and Exchange Commission); in addition, the US Department of Justice plays a key role in prosecuting 
misconduct related to criminal offences and anticompetitive behaviour of banks. We also collect fines 
issued by other regulatory agencies.10 Overall, we collect 146 sanctions resulting in both civil and 
criminal fines against EU listed banks during the period 2009-18. Finally, we augment the sample 
with country-level data collected from the World Economic Forum (2018) Global Gender Gap Report 
and International Monetary Fund.  
3.2. Variables 
To test Hypotheses 1 and 3, we calculate the dependent variable, N.Fine, as the number of misconduct 
fines imposed on a bank in a given year. In relation to Hypothesis 2, we employ a binary dependent 
variable, D.Fine_Criminal, which takes a value of one if a bank receives a criminal fine in a given 
year. We also use as dependent variable the number of misconduct fines imposed on a bank in a given 
year distinguishing between four main types of fines, that is, those related to: (i) banking business 
violations, N.Fine_Banking; (ii) economic sanction violations, N.Fine_Economic; (iii) market 
violations, N.Fine_Market; and (iv) administrative violations, N.Fine_Admin.  
To test all our three hypotheses, we use Female Director %, the proportion of female directors on the 
board in a given year, as our main board gender diversity variable (Cumming et al., 2015, Liu, 2018). 
In additional tests, we use a second board gender diversity variable, ∆ Female Director %, calculated 
                                                          
10 See Appendix A for the full list of the sampled sanctions and the relevant sanctioning regulatory agencies. 
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as the change in the proportion of female directors on the board in a given year. This variable captures 
the change in women representation in the boardroom regardless of the initial level, thereby reducing 
potential concerns that larger banks may have a higher proportion of female directors. Additionally, in 
order to investigate whether the effectiveness of female directors can be reinforced by the presence of 
women in other leadership positions, we use a dummy variable, Female Leader, which indicates a 
female chief executive officer (CEO) and/or chairperson or president. 
In additional analyses, we include other dimensions of board diversity, besides female representation 
(EBA, 2017). We add director age diversity, Director Age Diversity, measured as the coefficient of 
variation for board directors’ age which shows the dispersion of age within the board. We also include 
board internationalisation, Foreign Director %, measured as the proportion of foreign directors on the 
board. We add employee representation, Employee Representative %, measured as the proportion of 
employee representatives on the board. 
We employ a series of control variables, including board, bank, and country characteristics. Board 
size, Ln(Board Size), is measured as the natural logarithm of the number of directors on the board. 
Director tenure, Ln(Director Tenure), is the natural logarithm of the average tenure length of directors 
on the board. Director age, Ln(Director Age), is the mean age of board directors in logarithm form. 
We also include CEO characteristics: CEO tenure, Ln(CEO Tenure), is the natural logarithm of the 
CEO’s tenure length; CEO age, Ln(CEO Age), is the natural logarithm of the CEO’s age; CEO 
turnover, CEO Turnover, is a dummy variable equal to one in the year a new CEO is appointed.   
Turning to bank-specific controls, we include bank size, Size, measured as the natural logarithm of 
total assets. Larger banks tend to be more frequently fined. Moreover, large banks tend to be complex, 
which can potentially impact the effectiveness of the board in preventing misconduct. Return on 
equity, ROE, is included to account for the profitability of a bank, whereas risk is captured using the 
volatility of stock returns, Stock Return Volatility  ̧measured as the annualised volatility of daily stock 
market returns. We use the two latter variables as proxies for the financial health of a bank, to account 
for the existing evidence that firms in financial distress are more likely to commit fraud (Beasley, 
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1996; Cumming et al., 2015). We also include Tobin’s Q, Ln(Tobin’s Q), to control for bank charter 
value (Liu, 2018). All bank-specific controls are winsorised at the 5 percent level. 
For the country-specific controls, we include the country’s gender index rank, Gender Index Rank, 
which is based on the gender gap index score published by the World Economic Forum (2018) and 
captures the relative gaps between women and men in a country across four areas: health, education, 
economy, and politics. We also control for the macroeconomic conditions by including the GDP 
growth rate, GDP Growth. Finally, we include a dummy variable, G10, which takes the value of one 
for the G10 countries, that is, most developed economies.  
3.3. Model specification 
To determine whether gender diversity of the board is associated with bank misconduct, we employ 
the following model in a panel setup for bank-year it in country j: 
Misconductit,j=β0+β1Gender diversityi,t-1+β2Gender Index Rank𝑗
+ β
3

































𝐺10𝑗 + ∑ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡
𝑖 + ∑ 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑡
𝑖 + εit,j 
(1)        
We include the number and dollar amount of fines received by bank i in the year t-1 in the 
specification, to control for the impact of previous sanctions on the bank’s misconduct and the 
expected additional effort of regulatory authorities with recently (t-1) sanctioned banks. Year fixed 
effects are included to control for changes in the macroeconomic environment over time. We also 
include agency fixed effects to control for the different bank activities the sanctioning agencies 
supervise. The correlation matrix for the variables used in the regression analysis is reported in 
Appendix C. 
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To test our hypotheses, we deploy a negative binomial count model as the appropriate approach for 
modelling the number of fines per year in the presence of overdispersion in the dependent variable. To 
test Hypothesis 2, we also use a probit model for the binary dependent variable representing the 
incidence of criminal fines. We conduct robustness checks using the binary dependent variable 
(occurrence of fines) in a probit context and a Poisson model instead of a negative binomial that 
disregards overdispersion in the data.  
3.4. Endogeneity 
As in many corporate governance analyses, endogeneity concerns are an issue when modelling the 
relationship between female representation on the board and bank misconduct. Endogeneity could be 
the result of reverse causality due to the potentially non-random selection of women on the board. 
That is, the possibility for instance that women aim at becoming directors of banks that are less 
inclined to misconduct; or that they decide to leave the board as they acquire information about 
misconduct becoming more likely. Alternatively, troubled banks may choose to appoint more women 
in a bid to reverse past problems in a phenomenon known as cliff glass (Ryan and Haslam, 2005). On 
the other hand, banks that are more inclined to transgressions might decide to avoid having diverse 
boards. Omitted variable bias could be another source of endogeneity due to the challenges of 
determining all the factors driving bank misconduct. 
To address the issue of reverse causality that may bias our results, we run all the regressions using 
lagged variables for both board characteristics and bank-level controls (Dittmann et al., 2010; Liu, 
2018). Controlling for previous fines also helps to alleviate the concern that our results are driven by 
women joining boards of banks that received fewer fines. Changes in corporate governance, such as 
CEO turnover and board tenure, that could discourage women to join the board for similar reasons is 
also a factor we control for. One additional concern could be related to the lack of specific 
information on the actual date the misconduct occurs. We consider realised misconduct, that is, the 
cost that the bank incurred as a result of the breach of rules and regulations. In this context, the types 
of misconduct that we consider are relevant to the current board as they are harmful both financially 
and from a reputational point of view. In addition, the current board of directors is liable for past 
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misconduct and in charge of negotiating with regulators, which ultimately defines the outcome of 
sanctions.  
We address endogeneity caused by the omitted variable bias by using bank-specific controls (for 
example, size as larger or more profitable banks may have more gender-diverse boards) and by 
employing country-level controls as well as regulatory-agency effects to account for unobserved 
country-specific characteristics that are time-invariant and may be correlated with the level of gender 
diversity (that is, a country’s corporate culture) and for a bank’s business model. 
More in general, in our set-up, the issue of the women reacting to future misconduct is mitigated by 
our exogenous identification of bank misconduct based on US regulators. During the post-crisis 
period, the activism of the US regulators on European banks was exceptional, both in reach and 
severity of fines. To some extent, only in more recent years, the role of the US regulators as a global 
regulator has been established. This increased intensity in their supervisory effort on European banks 
also mitigates the concerns of undetected misconduct.  
4. Empirical results 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 1, Panel A, reports the descriptive statistics for the sample used in the regression analysis. 
Female directors are present in 86.8% of the bank-year observations. The sample banks average 16 
directors on their boards, of which 16.4% are women, with a maximum of 60% and a minimum of 
0%. Only 4.7% of the bank-year observations have a female CEO, whereas 23.2% have a female 
chairperson and 25.5% have women in leadership either through the CEO and/or chairperson roles. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Panel B of Table 1 reports the summary statistics for the fines issued against the sample banks. 
Around 7% of the bank-year observations have received misconduct fines. Of those, over one third 
are related to criminal sanctions (2.4% of the bank-year observations). On average, sample banks are 
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levied 0.169 misconduct fines per year, with a maximum of 8 and a minimum of 0.11 The most 
frequent type of fines are the ones related to market violations; on average, banks experience 0.057 
market lawsuits per year.  
Table 2 reports the evolution of female participation in the governance of the sample banks. Gender 
diversity increased over the sample period (and consistently so from 2010), with female directors 
being present in more boards and in a greater proportion. In particular, the number of banks with 
female directors increased from 80% to 96.1% of the sample between 2007 and 2017. Female 
representation on the board gradually increased from an average of 10.4% in 2007 to 26.1% in 2017. 
The presence of female leaders also shows an upward trend during the sample period. Female CEOs 
witnessed the greatest increase from only 1.5% bank-year observations with female CEOs in 2007 to 
7.9% in 2017, whereas female chairpersons increased from an average of 16.9% to 36.8%; the 
presence of female leaders in general increased from an average of 18.5% to 38.2% of bank-year 
observations between 2007 and 2017. Nevertheless, despite the tendency of banks to improve board 
gender diversity, their boardrooms remained male-dominated over the sample period.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Table 3 reports detailed summary statistics for misconduct fines of the sample banks by year. The 
total number of fines issued over the sample period is 146, with an average dollar amount per fine of 
$364.6m and a maximum of $9bn.12 Panels B and C of Table 3 report for each year in the sample the 
average aggregate fine amount received by each bank and the total amount fined across banks, 
respectively. The mean dollar amount fined in a bank-year is $872.7m and the total dollar amount 
fined across the sample is $53.2bn. The incidence of fines increased over the sample period, 
especially post-2012, peaking at 36 fines in 2015. The major share of fines both in incidence and 
dollar amount is related to market violations, with 49 fines over the sample period averaging $1.1bn 
per fine and amounting close to $30.6bn in total. Fines related to economic sanctions, albeit not as 
frequent (25 fines), hold the second largest share after market lawsuits accounting for over $14.2bn in 
                                                          
11 The maximum number of misconduct fines is observed for Société Générale in 2018. 
12 The maximum amount ($9bn) was levied against BNP Paribas in 2015, followed by $7.9bn against 
Deutsche Bank in 2017, and $5.6bn against the Royal Bank of Scotland in 2017. 
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total, with an average fine value of $791.1m. Fines related to banking business violations are 
relatively frequent (41 fines), but with a substantially smaller average amount of $248.9m and a total 
amount of $6.5bn. Fines related to administrative violations are the smallest in average amount 
($76m) and numbers (31 fines), amounting to $1.9bn. Overall, market manipulations and economic 
sanction violations are the most heavily penalised. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
4.2. Univariate analysis 
Table 4 reports the results of the univariate analysis where the sample banks are grouped based on 
board gender diversity. A bank is assigned to the high or low gender diversity sub-sample if the 
proportion of female directors in year t-1 is above or below the sample median, respectively. The data 
show that banks categorised into the high gender diversity group experience a higher number of 
misconduct fines than banks in the low gender diversity group, however this does not take into 
account other board and bank-level characteristics that could potentially drive the difference. Banks 
with more gender-diverse boards tend to be larger and have lower market risk and lower charter value. 
They are more likely to also have women in leadership positions including both the CEO and 
chairperson roles and a greater employee representation on the board. 
 [Insert Table 4 about here] 
4.3 Regression analysis  
4.3.1 Do female directors reduce misconduct? 
Table 5 reports the results of our negative binomial regression model for Hypothesis 1. Drawing on 
agency theory, we hypothesise a negative relationship between board gender diversity and bank 
misconduct. The negative binomial regression models estimate the relationship between our proxy of 
board gender diversity and the number of fines received by bank i in year t, employing a set of 
governance or board-level controls, bank- and country-level controls, and year and regulatory agency 
fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the country level to accommodate country-wise 
contemporaneous correlation caused by economic conditions and regulatory standards.  
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Models (1)-(3) focus on the effect of female directors on bank misconduct behaviour and employ as 
the key test variable the fraction of women on the board (Female Director %). To capture bank-level 
autocorrelation caused by the regulators’ imposing greater scrutiny towards banks that have a 
misconduct record, all models include the misconduct fines, number and dollar amount, received by a 
bank in the previous year as additional regressors. In Model (2), we add a time-invariant country-level 
control to capture the progress towards gender equality in the country where the bank is headquartered 
(Gender Index Rank), and in Model (3) we control for the effect of the presence of women in 
leadership positions within the governance of the bank including the CEO and/or chairperson or 
president roles (Female Leader). These models constitute our baseline specifications. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
The coefficient of our board gender diversity variable is negative and significant in all models. This 
indicates that female representation on the board is negatively associated with the frequency of 
misconduct fines. The coefficients in a negative binomial model can be directly interpreted as the 
change in the log differential of expected counts per unit change in the regressor or converted into the 
incidence rate ratio (IRR) which represents the change in the rate of incidence of fines. We convert the 
reported coefficients into the IRR using the exponential of the estimated coefficient multiplied by the 
change in the independent variable (eβΔx ) to obtain the ratio of the rate of fines per year, N.Fines1 / 
N.Fines0 , generated by the given change in our measure of gender diversity Δx = x1 - x0. Thus, our 
parameter estimates suggest that a one-unit increase in the proportion of women on the board 
decreases the frequency of fines by a fraction of 0.27, ceteris paribus. For the average change in the 
fraction of women in our sample (0.016) the number of fines will decrease by a fraction equal to 
(0.27)0.016 = 0.98. Given that the average fine amount in our sample is $364.6m, about 0.12% of banks’ 
average total assets, the estimated decrease in the frequency of banks’ misconduct incidences as a 
result of greater gender diversity on the board is equivalent to saving approximately $7.48m per year. 
The merit of female directors remains even after controlling for the level of gender equality in the 
country where the bank is headquartered and the presence of women in leadership positions within the 
bank’s governance.  
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The coefficient for the number of previously received misconduct fines is positive and significant, 
suggesting that misconduct episodes tend to be recurrent. However, the coefficient for the dollar 
amount of misconduct fines in the previous year has a negative and significant sign, suggesting that a 
more severe regulatory penalty can have a beneficial effect in decreasing the incidence of future 
misconduct (disciplining effect). Both the gender equality index and the presence of women in 
leadership positions show the expected negative signs but are not significant.  
As to the other controls, we find a positive and significant sign for bank size. This is not surprising, as 
larger banks with more cross-border activities are more frequently in the spotlight of regulators and 
thus more frequently fined. We also find a positive and significant coefficient for our proxy of bank 
risk (Stock Return Volatility), confirming that riskier banks are more likely to have lower conduct 
standards. Among our governance controls, we find that the length of the CEO tenure is positively 
associated with the frequency of misconduct fines. This is in line with the CEO entrenchment 
literature, suggesting that longer tenure might result in the CEO becoming more powerful and more 
likely to take risks (Bebchuk and Kamar, 2010). In addition, Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) show that 
monitoring declines as CEO tenure increases, possibly suggesting that the board becomes more 
entrenched and thus slower in detecting potential misconduct. 
Critical mass 
To explore the drivers of the effect of board gender diversity on bank misconduct we consider several 
tests. Our first test draws upon the critical mass theory, which posits that as female directors are 
outnumbered by their male counterparts, their number would have to exceed a certain minority 
threshold for them to be able to have any material impact on corporate outcomes such as monitoring, 
performance, and prevention of misconduct. There is consensus in the empirical literature that three or 
more directors form a critical mass and, in such instances, female directors would be more effective in 
voicing their opinion and influencing corporate decision-making (Liu et al, 2014; Liu, 2018). Thus, we 
run our baseline specifications in Eq. (1) using as a proxy of gender diversity an indicator variable 
(Critical Mass) for a minimum of three female directors. The results are reported in Table 6, Models 
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(1)-(3). All models bear out a more significant role of gender diversity in curbing misconduct when 
the number of female directors reaches a critical mass. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
In Models (4)-(5) we test whether the role of female directors, either in the form of critical mass or 
simply proportional presence, becomes more effective in reducing bank misconduct if supported by a 
female CEO, president, or chairperson (Female Leader interaction terms). The incremental effect of 
women in leadership positions is statistically significant only when there is no critical mass. This is 
evident by the fact that the impact of the proportion of female directors is only significant when there 
is also a woman in a leadership role. This additional effect disappears if there is female critical mass. 
Bank size effect 
The univariate analysis revealed that larger banks are more gender-diverse, but also more frequently 
fined. To control for the fact that larger banks receive more fines we introduce size effects in the 
baseline model by categorising the banks into quartiles based on total value of assets. We then assess 
the differential impact of gender diversity on misconduct for the large (top quartile) banks versus other 
banks by incorporating interaction terms between the fraction of female directors and the size dummy 
variables (Size Qi). The results of this test are presented in Table 7. 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
We find that large banks (first and second quartile), as expected, receive on average a higher number 
of fines but there is no evidence of an impact of gender diversity on misconduct for the banks of the 
top size quartile - the interaction term capturing the fraction of female directors in Q1 has the expected 
negative sign, but is statistically insignificant. Instead, we find a misconduct-reducing effect for the 
rest of the sampled banks as indicated by the negative and strongly significant interaction coefficient 
in Q234. This result reveals that the aggregate findings in Table 5 exhibit bank size heterogeneity that 
when accounted for leads to even stronger support for Hypothesis 1.  
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Change in proportion of female directors 
To complete our evidence in support of Hypothesis 1, we run the baseline specifications using as key 
variable the change in the fraction of female directors on the board between year t and year t-1 (∆ 
Female Director %). This proxy has two advantages. While the previous specifications in Table 5 
tested for the level of women participation, this proxy captures the change in the degree of women 
participation regardless of the initial level and therefore is less influenced by board size, which is in 
turn related to bank size. The results of this test are presented in Table 8.  
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
We find that with a one-unit increase in the change in the representation of women on the board, the 
number of fines decreases by a factor of 4-5%, ceteris paribus. Overall, the beneficial impact of 
female board directors on bank conduct as predicted in Hypothesis 1 is confirmed. 
4.3.2 Gender diversity and ethicality / risk aversion 
In this section we attempt to shed light on the channels through which women presence on the board 
can reduce bank misconduct. One of the challenges is the difficulty to disentangle the ethicality and 
risk aversion channels. The gender socialisation theory argues that women’s influence derives from 
their ability to foster more ethical decision-making (Cumming et al., 2015; Bryon and Post, 2016; 
McGuinnes et al., 2017; Liu, 2018). A higher female participation should therefore increase the 
board’s attitude towards more ethical issues, such as avoiding involvement in activities that could 
potentially undermine trust and confidence in the bank, and thus lead to a reduction in misconduct. On 
the other hand, gender might help explain differences in preferences and behaviour (Croson and 
Gneezy, 2009; DellaVigna et al., 2013) and risk attitude driven by the existence of a gender 
punishment gap (Egan et al., 2018). In our context, female directors’ role in improving conduct could 
be driven by either ethical values or risk aversion. 
To this end, we explore whether the mechanism through which gender diversity relates to bank 
misconduct can be identified in the link between female directors and the occurrence of severe 
offences. First, we distinguish between civil and criminal fines. The underlying assumption is that 
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criminal fines reflect more serious types of misconduct that substantially deviate from ethical codes of 
conduct. Indeed, criminal fines are rare (amounting to less than 3 per cent of sample year 
observations) but also often carry a custodial sentence and a lifetime ban from working in the industry.  
The results of this test are reported in Table 9. All models are estimated using a Probit specification 
for the occurrence of criminal fines and use the same set of controls as the baseline regressions 
presented in Table 5. Our dependent variable is a dummy variable (D.Fine_Criminal) which is equal 
to one if a bank receives a fine imposed by a court for criminal offences and zero otherwise.  
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
In Model (1) the coefficient on gender diversity suggests that the bigger the increase in the proportion 
of women on the board the lower the probability of criminal misconduct. However, the coefficient is 
weakly significant, Model (1), or not statistically significant, Models (2)-(3), providing only weak 
support for the ethicality channel.  
In Model (4) we augment the specification with an interaction term between the fraction of female 
directors on the board and the level of gender equality in the country where the bank is headquartered. 
This additional test aims to investigate whether the association of female directors with bank criminal 
misconduct depends on the country institutional culture, that is, more or less supportive of gender 
equality. The coefficient for the interaction term is negative and significant, while the coefficient for 
female directors is still negative but loses significance. We interpret this result as evidence that the 
role of women in supporting a more ethical behaviour of the board is closely intertwined with the 
recognition of their role in the society in which they operate. In other words, the ethical impact of 
female directors is only effective in countries with a higher level of gender equality.  
In Model (5) we augment the specification with an interaction term between the fraction of female 
directors on the board and the presence of women in leadership positions within bank governance. 
This test further examines whether the ethical role of gender diversity is more prominent in banks with 
women in leadership positions (ethical behaviour encouraged at the top). The result suggests that the 
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ethical role of female directors on the board is not enhanced by women representation in leadership 
roles within the governance of the bank. 
In an attempt to distinguish the ethicality from the risk aversion channel, we posit that if women are 
simply more ethical, then their misconduct-reducing effect should be similar for fines of different type. 
On the other hand, if risk aversion is also at play, we would expect the effect to be stronger for fines 
associated with greater reputational risk.  
Following Cumming et al. (2015), we conjecture that the severity of fines and, in turn, their 
reputational effect is represented by the extent of stock market reaction triggered by the fine. In an 
event study set-up, we measure the effect of fines on share prices based on the abnormal reaction of 
the bank suffering the fine computed as the deviation of its stock return from its expected value. The 
latter is estimated using the constant return model computed over the whole sample period.13 The 
Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) associated with misconduct fines is then regressed on four 
dummy variables indicating the type of fine.14 The estimated regression coefficients represent the 
Cumulative Average Abnormal Return (CAAR) and its significance is assessed using the cross-
sectional variation across the events through the t-statistic. The results of the event study are reported 
in Table 10.  
[Insert Table 10 about here] 
The findings are supportive of the view that economic sanction violations are more severe and carry 
higher reputational risk than the other types of fines. Economic sanction violations prompt 
significantly negative stock market returns in contrast to banking business, market, and administrative 
violations. The effect becomes apparent for larger event windows with a significant CAAR of –5.1% 
for the [0, 6] day event window, –7.6% for 6 to 9 days and –6.0% for 10 days after the event. The 
                                                          
13 The gains from employing the market model as opposed to the constant return model for the estimation of 
abnormal return in event studies are linked to reducing the variance of the abnormal return. However, Brown and 
Warner (1984) find that for random samples and short time periods, the market model is not systematically better 
at identifying the presence of abnormal returns than models that do not incorporate market-wide factors and 
firm-specific risk. 
14 Appendix A provides a description of the types of fine in each category. 
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abnormal returns associated with the other three types of fines are insignificant across all event 
windows.  
The results are robust to the choice of expected return used as input for deriving the abnormal returns 
as well as alternative regression specifications. Using the mean return over the 252 and 504 days 
before the announcement to estimate the expected return as well as including year and country fixed 
effects in the CAR regressions we obtain virtually identical results, which are available upon request.   
We now turn to examine whether the role of board gender diversity in reducing the number of fines 
varies depending on the severity of fine. Building on our event study finding of a more aggravate 
market response for economic fines we run our baseline specification in Eq. (1) linking gender 
diversity and frequency of fines for each of the four fine sub-samples.  
The results of this test are reported in Table 11. 
[Insert Table 11 about here] 
We find a negative and significant coefficient for our proxy of board gender diversity (Female 
Director %) only in relation to economic sanction violations, which as indicated by our event study 
are considered to be the most severe type of fines. This provides further support to the view that 
gender has a significant effect on the attitudes of managers towards business ethics but also risk-
taking. Economic sanctions are the result of complex and sometimes inconsistent global regimes, 
coupled with the increasing rigor in enforcements by US regulators. In this context, female directors 
can be influential in helping banks navigate the regulatory landscape and decrease the incidences of 
economic sanction violations, which are considered by the market as the ones that incur the highest 
reputational costs.  
Overall, the results in this sub-section support the risk aversion channel of Hypothesis 2 as the 
mechanism through which gender diversity improves bank culture and reduces conduct risk. 
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4.3.3 Gender diversity over other types of diversity 
Our Hypothesis 3 postulates that the impact of female directors might be less important in boards that 
are more diverse overall. We test this hypothesis by augmenting our baseline models with three other 
measures of board diversity, namely, age diversity captured by the coefficient of variation of the board 
directors’ age (Director Age Diversity), internationalisation proxied by the fraction of foreign directors 
(Foreign Director %), and employee representation measured as the fraction of employees (Employee 
Representative %) on the board (Arnaboldi et al., 2018). The results of this test are reported in Table 
12. 
[Insert Table 12 about here] 
The coefficient for gender diversity is negative and significant in all models. Interestingly, none of the 
other diversity characteristics seems to have an impact on the frequency of misconduct. These findings 
suggest that female directors exert a strongly significant negative effect on bank misconduct even in 
the presence of other aspects of board diversity. Overall, the results vindicate rejection of Hypothesis 3 
and support the view that the reduction in bank misconduct can be attributed to the role of female 
directors rather than a general effect of a more diverse board.  
4.3.4 Robustness tests 
We run the following additional tests. First, we run our baseline regressions using a Poisson model for 
the rate of fine occurrence, as it is a simpler model for count variables but disregards the 
overdispersion exhibited by our count data with a large number of zeros. The results remain 
unchanged and are available upon request. The likelihood ratio test for the significance of the 
overdispersion parameter also shows that the two models are statistically identical. 
Second, we run our baseline specifications including country fixed effects on a sub-sample of 
countries with at least three banks. The results of this test are presented in Table 13. We find negative 
and significant coefficients for our proxies of board gender diversity and evidence of bank size 
heterogeneity in the impact of female directors, both consistent with the results obtained using 
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country-level controls. Therefore, we can exclude the possibility that our results are driven by 
unobserved fundamental differences in the social, economic, and regulatory contexts across countries. 
[Insert Table 13 about here] 
In a third test, we address the literature on the glass cliff effect which posits that women are often 
appointed into leadership positions that are associated with increased risk of failure and test whether 
our results are driven by female directors joining boards of banks that are already experiencing distress 
(Ryan and Haslam, 2005; Haslam and Ryan, 2008; Liu, 2018). To do so, we exclude the cases of 
women joining the board during “troubled” times by dropping observations where the change in stock 
price volatility in the previous year is equal to or higher than the 75th percentile of the sample. The 
results of this test are reported in Table 14. The coefficients for our proxies of gender diversity remain 
negative and significant across all models after controlling for the potential glass cliff effect, which 
supports the validity of our Hypothesis 1.  
[Insert Table 14 about here] 
Finally, we test the robustness of our baseline results to the model specification using a pooled Probit 
model for the probability of being sanctioned. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one when a 
bank is fined and zero otherwise. The results of this test are reported in Table 15. The findings for our 
main proxy of gender diversity hold; the size differences in the effect of female directors on bank 
misconduct are also evident in this specification. 
[Insert Table 15 about here] 
5. Conclusions 
This study examines the relationship between board gender diversity and bank misconduct as captured 
by the civil and criminal fines imposed by US regulators on European banks. Bank misconduct has 
significant implications not only for individual financial institutions, as large regulatory fines can 
harm their soundness but also for society as misconduct events reduce the trust in the financial 
system. Therefore, it is important to understand the role of board gender diversity in reducing bank 
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misconduct, as its implications are systemic in nature and contribute to strengthening financial 
stability.  
Post-crisis, US regulators have issued a record number of fines to foreign financial institutions. This 
offers a unique set-up for our analysis that mitigates regulatory capture bias. We hand-collect and 
analyse misconduct fines issued to European listed banks by all US regulatory agencies, both relating 
to criminal sanctions and civil infringements. We find that a larger presence of women on the board of 
directors is associated with fewer misconduct fines. The effect is economically significant: the 
estimated decrease in the frequency of banks’ misconduct fines as a result of greater gender diversity 
on the board is equivalent to a saving of $7.48 million per year. These results seem to provide support 
to the view that increased gender diversity helps reducing conduct risk, that is, it helps fostering a 
better corporate culture.  
To understand the mechanisms through which the presence of women affects bank misconduct, we 
test the ethicality / risk aversion channel versus the diversity channel. We find evidence to support the 
ethicality channel, as indicated by the lower number of criminal fines, conditional on the bank being 
based in a country with a lower gender gap. We also find support for the risk aversion view, as gender 
diversity is associated with reducing severe types of misconduct such as economic sanction violations, 
currently one of the biggest sanction-related challenges for US and European banks. To test the 
diversity view, we consider other aspects of board diversity, including age diversity, the presence of 
foreign directors and employee representatives. We find no evidence to support that it is board 
diversity, rather than the presence of women, that is associated with decreased bank misconduct. Our 
results therefore suggest that women bring a special set of skills to corporate boards, in line with the 
gender socialisation theory interpretation. 
Interestingly, the impact of women representation on bank misconduct is not present for the largest 
banks. While current reforms often target the inclusion of more female directors in larger banks, our 
results point towards a beneficial effect of board gender diversity also for medium-sized and smaller 
banks. Such banks may not have the same relevance for financial stability as larger banks, but their 
role in maintaining trust and confidence in the financial system should be taken into account. 
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Additional evidence points to a recidivism of bank misconduct and the strong deterrent represented by 
larger monetary penalties.  
One limitation of this study is that it does not directly investigate whether the regulatory fines as a 
consequence of misconduct events trigger changes in the governance of the bank, or prompt the 
bank’s senior management to consider including more women on the board in order to increase the 
perceived ethicality of the board to stakeholders and regulators. Additional analyses could also 
explore whether the relationship between board gender diversity and bank misconduct has positively 
benefited from the recent corporate governance reforms that many countries adopted post-crisis. This 
would provide evidence to support the adoption of gender quotas not only for improving diversity in 
boardrooms and strengthening governance, but also for promoting bank behaviour to restore trust in 
the financial industry. 
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Table 1: Summary statistics.  
 
Variable   N   Mean Median Std. dev. Minimum Maximum 
Panel A: Corporate governance  
       
Female Director 789 0.868 1.000 0.339 0.000 1.000 
Female Director % 789 0.164 0.148 0.121 0.000 0.600 
∆ Female Director % 693 0.016 0.000 0.058 -0.250 0.222 
Female CEO 789 0.047 0.000 0.212 0.000 1.000 
Female Chair 789 0.232 0.000 0.422 0.000 1.000 
Female Leader 789 0.255 0.000 0.436 0.000 1.000 
Board Size 789 16.129 15.000 5.916 4.000 41.000 
Director Tenure 789 6.203 5.900 2.781 0.100 16.671 
Director Age 789 58.325 58.588 4.602 35.800 70.385 
CEO Tenure 789 5.857 4.000 5.110 1.000 28.000 
CEO Age 789 56.103 56.000 7.278 33.000 79.000 
CEO Turnover 789 0.147 0.000 0.354 0.000 1.000 
Director Age Diversity 789 0.145 0.142 0.047 0.013 0.905 
Foreign Director % 789 0.197 0.182 0.204 0.000 1.000 
Employee Representative % 789 0.074 0.000 0.127 0.000 0.600 
       
Panel B: Misconduct fines 
       
D.Fine 863 0.071 0.000 0.256 0.000 1.000 
N.Fine  863 0.169 0.000 0.77 0.000 8.000 
N.Fine_Banking 863 0.048 0.000 0.299 0.000 3.000 
N.Fine_Economic 863 0.029 0.000 0.221 0.000 3.000 
N.Fine_Market 863 0.057 0.000 0.341 0.000 4.000 
N.Fine_Admin 863 0.036 0.000 0.220 0.000 2.000 
Fine (m) 863 61.686 0.000 520.126 0.000 9033.557 
D.Fine_Criminal 863 0.024 0.000 0.154 0.000 1.000 
       
Panel C: Bank- and country-level controls 
       
Total Assets (bn) 789 306.766 76.275 473.087 3.263 1641.308 
ROE 789 0.064 0.076 0.106 -0.210 0.248 
Stock Return Volatility 787 0.384 0.338 0.183 0.140 0.811 
Tobin’s Q 785 2.278 1.004 3.333 0.927 13.612 
GDP Growth 789 0.992 1.400 2.844 -9.100 25.000 
Gender Index Score 789 0.745 0.738 0.039 0.674 0.822 
       
The table reports the summary statistics for the sampled banks. Bank-level control variables are winsorised at 
the 5 percent level. Definitions of the variables are provided in Appendix B. 
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Table 2: Female representation in bank governance. 
 
 Female Director Female Director % Female CEO Female Chair Female Leader 
      
 2007 0.800 0.104 0.015 0.169 0.185 
 2008 0.806 0.113 0.015 0.209 0.224 
 2009 0.716 0.103 0.015 0.209 0.224 
 2010 0.750 0.101 0.044 0.176 0.206 
 2011 0.824 0.111 0.044 0.235 0.265 
 2012 0.859 0.132 0.042 0.197 0.225 
 2013 0.938 0.165 0.037 0.188 0.212 
 2014 0.944 0.204 0.070 0.211 0.239 
 2015 0.949 0.226 0.064 0.256 0.282 
 2016 0.949 0.250 0.077 0.308 0.333 
 2017 0.961 0.261 0.079 0.368 0.382 
      
The table reports the statistics on gender diversity in bank governance over the sample period. The mean value 
is reported for: (i) female director dummy variable, (ii) fraction of female directors, (iii) female CEO dummy 
variable, (iv) female chairperson / president dummy variable, and (v) female leader dummy variable. Definitions 
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Table 3: Misconduct fines - Time trend by sanction type. 
 
Panel A: Number of fines  
   N.Fine  N.Fine_Banking N.Fine_Economic N.Fine_Market N.Fine_Admin 
 2009 6 1 2 0 3 
 2010 5 0 3 0 2 
 2011 2 0 0 1 1 
 2012 12 4 4 4 0 
 2013 12 1 5 4 2 
 2014 17 4 1 10 2 
 2015 36 11 5 9 11 
 2016 16 8 1 2 5 
 2017 18 6 1 8 3 
 2018 22 6 3 11 2 
Total 146 41 25 49 31 
      
Panel B: Average fine amount ($ m) 
     Fine Fine_Banking Fine_Economic Fine_Market Fine_Admin 
 2009 80.663 8.385 392.000 0.000 0.977 
 2010 270.454 0.000 266.200 0.000 276.835 
 2011 72.524 0.000 0.000 145.000 0.048 
 2012 915.638 1010.500 537.000 189.183 0.000 
 2013 521.408 50.000 34.010 1202.685 7.815 
 2014 292.976 107.540 258.661 394.500 41.500 
 2015 1652.255 333.330 2575.298 912.435 34.043 
 2016 137.744 201.075 2.486 0.655 4.592 
 2017 2043.182 98.387 425.000 2677.320 48.562 
 2018 1347.132 134.312 852.467 1415.925 445.895 
Total 872.710 248.862 791.136 1093.701 76.034 
      
Panel C: Total fine amount ($ m) 
     Fine Fine_Banking Fine_Economic Fine_Market Fine_Admin 
 2009 403.315 8.385 392.000 0.000 2.930 
 2010 1352.269 0.000 798.600 0.000 553.669 
 2011 145.048 0.000 0.000 145.000 0.048 
 2012 3662.550 2021.000 1074.000 567.550 0.000 
 2013 2607.039 50.000 136.038 2405.370 15.630 
 2014 2636.781 322.620 258.661 1972.500 83.000 
 2015 16522.545 2333.311 10301.193 3649.740 238.301 
 2016 826.462 804.300 2.486 1.310 18.367 
 2017 14302.272 393.548 425.000 13386.600 97.124 
 2018 10777.057 537.250 852.467 8495.550 891.790 
Total 53235.338 6470.414 14240.445 30623.620 1900.858 
      
The table reports the summary statistics on misconduct fines of the sampled banks over the sample period (by 
year and in total). The statistics are reported for: (i) all misconduct fines and separately for those related to (ii) 
banking business violations, (iii) economic sanction violations, (iv) market violations, and (v) administrative 
violations. Panel A reports the number of fines; Panel B reports the average amount of fines; and Panel C 
reports the total amount of fines. Definitions of the variables are provided in Appendix B. 
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Table 4: Univariate analysis by board gender diversity. 
 
   High gender diversity Low gender diversity Difference-in-means 
     Diff           p-value 
      
D.Fine 342 0.135 425 0.035 -0.099 0.000*** 
N.Fine 342 0.354 425 0.059 -0.295 0.000*** 
Fine (m) 342 143.846 425 9.505 -134.34 0.001*** 
Female CEO 342 0.100 425 0.019 -0.081 0.000*** 
Female Chair 341 0.419 425 0.124 -0.294 0.000*** 
Female Leader 342 0.456 425 0.137 -0.32 0.000*** 
Board Size       342 16.304 425 16.101 -0.203 0.636 
Director Tenure  342 6.343 425 6.201 -0.143 0.479 
Director Age 342 58.812 425 58.222 -0.590 0.070* 
CEO Tenure 342 6.12 425 5.979 -0.141 0.715 
CEO Age 342 55.661 425 56.76 1.099 0.036** 
CEO Turnover 342 0.146 425 0.139 -0.007 0.771 
Director Age Diversity 342 0.136 425 0.15 0.015 0.000*** 
Foreign Directors % 342 0.202 425 0.201 -0.001 0.957 
Employee Representative % 342 0.099 425 0.057 -0.042 0.000*** 
Total Assets (bn) 296 462.507 415 218.606 -243.901 0.000*** 
ROE 296 0.062 415 0.054 -0.007 0.327 
Stock Return Volatility 342 0.339 423 0.416 0.077 0.000*** 
Tobin’s Q 294 1.65 412 2.502 0.853 0.001*** 
      
The table reports the results of the univariate analysis by gender diversity of the board, where a bank is assigned 
to the high gender diversity sub-sample in year t if the fraction of female directors on its board in year t-1 is 
equal to or greater than the sample median, and to the low gender diversity sub-sample otherwise. The t-test for 
the equality of means is reported in the last column, where *, **, *** indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% 
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Table 5: Board gender diversity and bank misconduct - Baseline regressions.  
 
    N.Fine N.Fine N.Fine 
    (1) (2) (3) 
Female Director % -1.293* -1.259* -1.731* 
   (0.743) (0.740) (0.950) 
Gender Index Rank  -0.019  
    (0.043)  
Female Leader   -0.366 
     (0.253) 
 N.Fine 0.235*** 0.244*** 0.275*** 
   (0.079) (0.085) (0.075) 
 Ln(Fine) -0.026* -0.027* -0.034** 
   (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
 Ln(Board Size) 0.178 0.132 0.217 
   (0.255) (0.273) (0.240) 
 Ln(Director Tenure) 0.580 0.639 0.564 
   (0.396) (0.453) (0.404) 
 Ln(Director Age) -2.653 -3.257 -2.752 
   (1.983) (2.557) (1.932) 
 Ln(CEO Tenure) 0.731*** 0.731*** 0.764*** 
   (0.252) (0.247) (0.218) 
 Ln(CEO Age) -0.961 -1.050 -1.662 
   (0.937) (1.036) (1.249) 
 CEO Turnover 0.310 0.294 0.312 
   (0.537) (0.512) (0.489) 
 Size 1.311*** 1.344*** 1.438*** 
   (0.216) (0.250) (0.276) 
 ROE 0.278 0.298 0.058 
   (1.575) (1.579) (1.142) 
 Stock Return Volatility 1.938** 1.867** 2.139*** 
   (0.776) (0.727) (0.732) 
 Ln(Tobin’s Q) 0.122 0.096 0.045 
   (0.261) (0.243) (0.278) 
 GDP Growth -0.043 -0.032 -0.043 
   (0.106) (0.097) (0.104) 
 G10 0.675 0.717* 0.602 
   (0.427) (0.422) (0.388) 
Intercept -26.439** -24.266** -26.518** 
   (10.705) (11.896) (10.524) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Agency FE Yes Yes Yes 
IRR Female Director % 0.274 0.284 0.177 
Observations 765 765 765 
Log-Likelihood  -119.01*** -118.97*** -118.25*** 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.62 0.62 0.62 
 
The table reports the results from the negative binomial model for the number of misconduct fines in year t. All 
independent variables are lagged by one year. Standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in 
parentheses. IRR indicates the Incidence Rate Ratio for the main variable in the analysis. Agency FE stands for 
the type of agency that issues the fine. The Log-Likelihood statistic pertains to the null hypothesis that the 
model coefficients are jointly zero. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. 
Definitions of the variables are provided in Appendix B. 
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Table 6: Critical mass and female leadership.   
 
    N.Fine N.Fine N.Fine N.Fine N.Fine 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Critical Mass -0.734** -0.734** -0.807*** -0.871**  
   (0.324) (0.327) (0.310) (0.347)  
Gender Index Rank  -0.021    
    (0.041)    
Female Leader   -0.382 -0.589  
   (0.254) (0.388)  
Critical Mass x Female 
Leader 




Female Director %     -1.189 
     (0.750) 
Female Director % x 
Female Leader 
    -1.318** 
(0.666) 
N.Fine 0.255*** 0.264*** 0.303*** 0.300*** 0.286*** 
   (0.081) (0.085) (0.071) (0.072) (0.075) 
Ln(Fine) -0.034** -0.034** -0.044*** -0.044*** -0.035** 
   (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.014) 
Ln(Board Size) 0.432 0.379 0.519* 0.505** 0.190 
   (0.300) (0.301) (0.275) (0.257) (0.242) 
Ln(Director Tenure) 0.496 0.563 0.482 0.469 0.651 
   (0.334) (0.397) (0.362) (0.387) (0.436) 
 Ln(Director Age) -3.087 -3.759 -3.179* -3.327* -2.468 
   (1.955) (2.331) (1.889) (1.857) (2.023) 
 Ln(CEO Tenure) 0.737*** 0.737*** 0.761*** 0.771*** 0.729*** 
   (0.262) (0.258) (0.236) (0.216) (0.217) 
 Ln(CEO Age) -1.189* -1.296 -1.865* -1.947** -1.481 
   (0.689) (0.814) (0.960) (0.955) (1.058) 
 CEO Turnover 0.341 0.321 0.355 0.373 0.271 
   (0.545) (0.517) (0.506) (0.480) (0.478) 
 Size 1.348*** 1.385*** 1.471*** 1.495*** 1.389*** 
   (0.180) (0.216) (0.230) (0.223) (0.231) 
 ROE -0.401 -0.382 -0.651 -0.602 0.081 
   (1.965) (1.986) (1.505) (1.487) (1.215) 
 Stock Return Volatility 1.132 1.055 1.348 1.440* 2.020*** 
   (0.920) (0.856) (0.840) (0.797) (0.775) 
 Ln(Tobin’s Q) 0.112 0.081 0.052 0.063 0.027 
   (0.211) (0.184) (0.206) (0.191) (0.275) 
 GDP Growth -0.023 -0.011 -0.023 -0.028 -0.037 
   (0.109) (0.101) (0.109) (0.109) (0.098) 
 G10 0.590 0.637 0.494 0.481 0.678* 
   (0.458) (0.438) (0.436) (0.434) (0.373) 
Intercept -24.827** -22.371* -25.096** -25.451** -27.253*** 
  (11.148) (11.599) (10.910) (10.946) (10.565) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Agency FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 765 765 765 765 765 
Log-Lik Full Model -117.95*** -117.90*** -117.14*** -117.07*** -118.05*** 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.623 0.623 0.626 0.626 0.623 
   
The table reports the results from the negative binomial model for the number of misconduct fines in year t. The 
key variable is Critical Mass. All independent variables are lagged by one year. Standard errors clustered at the 
country level are reported in parentheses. Agency FE stands for the type of agency that issues the fine. The Log-
Likelihood statistic pertains to the null hypothesis that the model coefficients are jointly zero. ***, **, * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. Definitions of the variables are provided in Appendix B. 
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Table 7: Board gender diversity and bank misconduct – Size effects. 
    N.Fine N.Fine N.Fine 
    (1) (2) (3) 
 Female Director % x Size Q1 -0.517 -0.506 -0.936 
   (0.643) (0.655) (0.904) 
 Female Director % x Size Q234 -9.702*** -9.743*** -9.835*** 
   (2.348) (2.402) (2.395) 
 Size Q1 10.910*** 10.519*** 11.030*** 
   (0.851) (0.853) (0.893) 
Size Q2 12.209*** 11.830*** 12.387*** 
 (0.8210) (0.820) (0.970) 
Size Q3 -5.298*** -5.295*** -5.641*** 
 (0.547) (0.563) (0.588) 
Gender Index Rank  -0.016  
    (0.043)  
Female Leader   -0.253 
     (0.253) 
N.Fine 0.254*** 0.262*** 0.279*** 
   (0.076) (0.085) (0.070) 
Ln(Fine) -0.033** -0.033** -0.037*** 
   (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) 
Ln(Board Size) 0.155 0.116 0.184 
   (0.248) (0.280) (0.247) 
Ln(Director Tenure) 0.610* 0.654 0.578 
   (0.365) (0.440) (0.395) 
Ln(Director Age) -3.036 -3.590 -3.059 
   (1.923) (2.809) (1.951) 
Ln(CEO Tenure) 0.679*** 0.681*** 0.713*** 
   (0.233) (0.231) (0.216) 
Ln(CEO Age) -0.742 -0.832 -1.263 
   (0.811) (0.920) (1.124) 
CEO Turnover 0.375 0.363 0.366 
   (0.521) (0.498) (0.492) 
Size 1.052*** 1.084*** 1.212*** 
   (0.109) (0.146) (0.179) 
ROE 1.041 1.065 0.796 
   (1.377) (1.383) (1.053) 
Stock Return Volatility 1.911** 1.841** 2.028*** 
   (0.759) (0.721) (0.757) 
Ln(Tobin’s Q) 0.143 0.119 0.077 
   (0.241) (0.217) (0.238) 
GDP Growth -0.067 -0.057 -0.067 
   (0.095) (0.084) (0.093) 
G10 0.652** 0.678** 0.578* 
   (0.308) (0.324) (0.299) 
Intercept -29.605*** -27.220** -31.731*** 
 (9.496) (12.510) (9.911) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Agency FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 765 765 765 
Log-Likelihood  -116.231 -116.200 -115.902 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.628 0.629 0.629 
The table reports the results from the negative binomial model for the number of misconduct fines in year t accounting 
for the size of the bank. Size Qi, i = 1, 2, 3, 4, represents banks in the ith quartile as grouped by asset value, where 1 
stands for the top quartile. The interaction term Female Director % x Size Qi is the key variable defined as the 
percentage of female directors in the ith size quartile. All independent variables are lagged by one year. Standard errors 
clustered at the country level are reported in parentheses. Agency FE stands for the type of agency that issues the fine. 
The Log-Likelihood statistic pertains to the null hypothesis that the model coefficients are jointly zero. ***, **, * 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. Definitions of the variables are provided in Appendix B. 
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Table 8: Change in board gender diversity and bank misconduct. 
    N.Fine N.Fine N.Fine 
    (1) (2) (3) 
 ΔFemale Director % -2.968* -3.067* -3.072* 
   (1.769) (1.765) (1.855) 
Gender Index Rank  -0.028  
    (0.047)  
Female Leader   -0.326 
   (0.228) 
 N.Fine 0.257*** 0.270*** 0.300*** 
   (0.081) (0.088) (0.078) 
 Ln(Fine) -0.036** -0.037** -0.045*** 
   (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
 Ln(Board Size) 0.269 0.193 0.334 
   (0.311) (0.332) (0.301) 
 Ln(Director Tenure) 0.500 0.591 0.482 
   (0.393) (0.459) (0.404) 
 Ln(Director Age) -2.266 -3.239 -2.245 
   (2.430) (3.010) (2.406) 
 Ln(CEO Tenure) 0.662** 0.667** 0.670*** 
   (0.263) (0.262) (0.234) 
 Ln(CEO Age) -0.993 -1.153 -1.522 
   (0.728) (0.876) (0.946) 
 CEO Turnover 0.287 0.270 0.282 
   (0.560) (0.532) (0.525) 
 Size 1.290*** 1.342*** 1.385*** 
   (0.199) (0.244) (0.237) 
 ROE 0.672 0.687 0.581 
   (1.556) (1.575) (1.163) 
 Stock Return Volatility 2.230*** 2.092*** 2.500*** 
   (0.735) (0.664) (0.727) 
 Ln(Tobin’s Q) 0.194 0.153 0.146 
   (0.236) (0.208) (0.243) 
 GDP Growth -0.072 -0.057 -0.078 
   (0.105) (0.094) (0.102) 
 G10 0.481 0.543 0.392 
   (0.491) (0.483) (0.476) 
 Intercept -27.598** -23.963* -28.153** 
   (12.154) (13.229) (12.095) 
 Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
 Agency FE Yes Yes Yes 
 IRR ΔFemale Director % 0.0514 0.0466 0.0463 
 Observations 672 672 672 
 Log-Likelihood -118.41*** -118.31*** -117.77*** 
 Pseudo R-Squared 0.611 0.611 0.611 
    
The table reports results from the negative binomial model for the number of misconduct fines in year t. The key 
variable is the change in the fraction of female directors, ΔFemale Director %. All independent variables are 
lagged by one year. Standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in parentheses. IRR indicates the 
Incidence Rate Ratio for the main variable in the analysis. Agency FE stands for the type of agency that issues 
the fine. The Log-Likelihood statistic pertains to the null hypothesis that the model coefficients are jointly zero. 
***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. Definitions of the variables are provided 
in Appendix B. 
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Table 9: Ethical / risk aversion channel - Criminal vs civil fines.  










    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Female Director % -1.576* -1.062 -1.138 5.528 -1.559 
   (0.884) (1.091) (1.515) (4.103) (0.952) 
Gender Index Rank  -0.068    
    (0.061)    
Female Leader   0.170   
     (0.294)   
Female Director % x Gender 
Index Rank  
   -0.414*  
    (0.246)  
Female Director % x Female 
Leader  
    0.811 
(1.195) 
N.Fine -0.084 -0.099 -0.079 -0.141 -0.055 
   (0.312) (0.311) (0.286) (0.305) (0.247) 
Ln(Fine) 0.068* 0.074* 0.070** 0.078** 0.066** 
   (0.036) (0.040) (0.035) (0.035) (0.032) 
Board Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Agency FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 765 765 765 765 765 
Log-Likelihood -23.06*** -22.87*** -23.01*** -22.68*** -22.98*** 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 
      
The table reports the probit model results for the probability of receiving a criminal fine for misconduct in year 
t. All independent variables are lagged by one year. Standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in 
parentheses. Agency FE stands for the type of agency that issues the fine. The Log-Likelihood statistic pertains 
to the null hypothesis that the model coefficients are jointly zero. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 
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Table 10:  CARs around misconduct fines announcement by type of misconduct.  
    Announcement Window Market Reaction t-Stat. 
    (1) (2) (3) 
    
D.Fine_Banking (0, 5) 0.012 1.03 
   (0, 6) 0.019 0.97 
 (0, 7) 0.016 0.58 
 (0, 8) 0.017 0.61 
 (0, 9) 0.017 0.63 
 (0, 10) 0.015 0.58 









   (0, 6) -0.051 -1.92* 
  (0, 7) -0.076 -2.03** 
 (0, 8) -0.076 -2.02** 
 (0, 9) -0.076 -1.97** 
 (0, 10) -0.060 -1.64* 









   (0, 6) 0.008 0.53 
  (0, 7) 0.011 0.50 
 (0, 8) 0.008 0.35 
 (0, 9) 0.004 0.20 
 (0, 10) 0.014 0.66 









   (0, 6) 0.010 0.50 
   (0, 7) 0.016 0.53 
 (0, 8) 0.019 0.63 
 (0, 9) 0.022 0.71 
 (0, 10) 0.023 0.80 
 (0, 15) 0.026 1.42 
    
The table reports cumulative average abnormal returns (CARs) following the announcement of misconduct 
fines. For each type of fine, we report CARs over different event windows. The event study is based on 112 
events. There are 39 cases of multiple sanctions, that is, concurrent fines from different agencies or of different 
type. On days with multiple misconduct announcements the type of misconduct is determined using the majority 
rule and, in the few cases of tie, by considering the amount of fine. Cumulative abnormal returns are based on 
constant expected return model estimated over the whole sample period. The t-statistics are derived based on the 
cross-sectional standard error of the abnormal returns.  ***,**,* denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, 
respectively. Definitions of the variables are provided in Appendix B.  
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Table 11: Ethical / risk aversion channel - Type of fine. 
    N.Fine_Banking N.Fine_Economic N.Fine_Market N.Fine_Admin 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Female Director % -2.486 -4.298*** 1.260 1.407 
   (2.351) (1.235) (1.002) (2.330) 
N.Fine 0.149 -0.556** -0.206* -0.187*** 
   (0.284) (0.254) (0.116) (0.042) 
Ln(Fine) -0.025 0.036 0.050*** 0.037 
   (0.055) (0.034) (0.015) (0.031) 
















Agency FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 765 765 765 765 
Log-Likelihood -53.78*** -60.64*** -55.02*** -52.45*** 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.62 0.40 0.64 0.58 
The table reports the results from the negative binomial model for four types of misconduct fines in year t. The 
key variable is the fraction of female directors. All independent variables are lagged by one year. Standard 
errors clustered at the country level are reported in parentheses. Board controls include board size, directors’ 
tenure and age, and CEO’s tenure, age, and turnover. Bank controls include bank size, profitability, stock return 
volatility, and Tobin’s Q. Country controls include gender index rank, GDP growth, and G10 indicator. Agency 
FE stands for the type of agency that issues the fine. The Log-Likelihood statistic pertains to the null hypothesis 
that the model coefficients are jointly zero. ***,**,* denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 12: Diversity channel. 
    N.Finet N.Fine N.Fine N.Fine 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Female Director % -1.724* -1.561*** -1.766* -1.659*** 
   (0.942) (0.471) (1.043) (0.558) 
Director Age Diversity 1.609   1.708 
   (2.529)   (2.118) 
Foreign Director %  -0.206  -0.185 
    (1.178)  (1.190) 
Employee Representative %   0.351 0.475 
     (1.700) (1.526) 
Gender Index Rank -0.019 -0.028 -0.032 -0.026 
   (0.050) (0.045) (0.062) (0.064) 
Female Leader -0.415 -0.377 -0.389 -0.430 
   (0.275) (0.255) (0.296) (0.278) 
N.Fine 0.295*** 0.290*** 0.290*** 0.300*** 
   (0.082) (0.086) (0.090) (0.088) 
Ln(Fine) -0.035** -0.034** -0.035** -0.036** 
   (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) 
Board Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Agency FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 765 765 765 765 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.622 0.622 0.622 0.623 
Log-Likelihood -118.06*** -118.13*** -118.14*** -118.015*** 
The table reports the results from the negative binomial model for misconduct fines in year t. The key variable is 
the fraction of female directors. Additional proxies for board diversity are added to test for the diversity channel. 
All independent variables are lagged by one year. Standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in 
parentheses. Board controls include board size, directors’ tenure and age, and CEO’s tenure, age, and turnover. 
Bank controls include bank size, profitability, stock return volatility, and Tobin’s Q. Country controls include 
gender index rank, GDP growth, and G10 indicator. Agency FE stands for the type of agency that issues the 
fine. The Log-Likelihood statistic pertains to the null hypothesis that the model coefficients are jointly zero. 
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Table 13: Board gender diversity and bank misconduct - Country fixed effects. 
  
     N.Fine  N.Fine  N.Fine  N.Fine  N.Fine  N.Fine  
     (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
              
Female Director %  x Size Q1  0.988  0.526          
    (1.033)  (1.252)          
Female Director %  x Size Q234  -7.226**  -7.633***          
    (2.813)  (2.687)          
  (17.567)  (22.035)          
ΔFemale Director %      -3.245***  -3.140***      
        (1.025)  (1.121)      
Critical Mass          -0.656**  -0.710***  
            (0.326)  (0.247)  
Female Leader    -0.371    -0.305    -0.368  
      (0.307)    (0.270)    (0.293)  
N.Fine  0.211**  0.246***  0.232***  0.261***  0.215**  0.254***  
    (0.088)  (0.080)  (0.085)  (0.073)  (0.091)  (0.073)  
Ln(Fine)  -0.034**  -0.040***  -0.038***  -0.043***  -0.033**  -0.040***  
    (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.015)  (0.013)  
Board Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Bank Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Agency FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Country FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Size FE         Yes Yes     
Observations  674  674  592  592  674  674  
Log-Likelihood  109.63***  108.91***  -109.96***  -109.44***  -109.84***  -109.11***  
Pseudo R-Squared  0.64  0.64  0.63  0.63  0.64  0.64  
              
The table reports the results from the negative binomial model with country fixed effects for the number of misconduct 
fines in year t. Size Qi, i = 1, 2, 3, 4, represents banks in the ith quartile as grouped by asset value, where 1 stands for the 
top quartile. In Models (1) and (2), the interaction term Female Director %  x Size Qi defines the percentage of female 
directors in the ith size quartile. Size FE denotes the size quartile indicators Size Qi. In Models (3) and (4), the key 
variable is the change in the fraction of female directors, ΔFemale Director %. In Models (5) and (6), the key variable is 
the critical mass dummy variable, Critical Mass. All independent variables are lagged by one year. Standard errors 
clustered at the country level are reported in parentheses. Board controls include board size, directors’ tenure and age, 
and CEO’s tenure, age, and turnover. Bank controls include bank size, profitability, stock return volatility, and Tobin’s 
Q. Country controls include gender index rank, GDP growth, and G10 indicator. Agency FE stands for the type of 
agency that issues the fine. The Log-Likelihood statistic pertains to the null hypothesis that the model coefficients are 
jointly zero. ***,**,* denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. Definitions of the variables are 
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    N.Fine N.Fine N.Fine 
    (1) (2) (3) 
    
Female Director % -6.413***   
   (1.913)   
ΔFemale Director %  -2.848*  
    (1.470)  
Critical Mass   -0.609*** 
     (1.025) 
Gender Index Rank -0.090 -0.064 -0.063 
   (0.075) (0.063) (0.067) 
Female Leader -0.944*** -0.437 -0.637* 
   (0.352) (0.356) (0.330) 
N.Fine 0.531*** 0.236 0.526*** 
   (0.156) (0.255) (0.184) 
Ln(Fine) -0.040*** -0.035 -0.050*** 
   (0.015) (0.077) (0.018) 
Board Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Country Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Agency FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 490 404 310 
Log-Likelihood -77.87*** -72.41*** -79.46*** 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.65 0.62 0.64 
 
The table reports the results from the negative binomial model for the number of misconduct fines in year t for 
different proxies for gender diversity. The sub-sample only includes observations for which the change in the 
stock return volatility in the previous period is lower than the 75th percentile. Standard errors clustered at the 
country level are reported in parentheses. Board controls include the board size, directors’ tenure and age, and 
CEO’s tenure, age, and turnover. Bank controls include the bank size, profitability, stock return volatility, and 
Tobin’s Q. Country controls include the gender index rank, GDP growth, and G10 dummy variable. Agency FE 
stands for the type of agency that issues the fine. Asterisks next to the Log-Likelihood value represent rejection 
of the null hypothesis that the model coefficients are jointly zero. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 
10% level, respectively. Definitions of the variables are provided in Appendix B. 
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Table 15: Board gender diversity and bank misconduct - Probit regressions. 
    D.Fine D.Fine D.Fine 
    (1) (2) (3) 
Female Director % x Size Q1 1.443 1.444 1.756* 
   (0.929) (0.947) (1.054) 
Female Director % x Size Q234 -5.470*** -5.473*** -5.396*** 
   (1.578) (1.638) (1.398) 
 (9.032) (12.179) (9.176) 
Gender Index Rank  -0.001  
    (0.062)  
Female Leader   0.407* 
     (0.244) 
N.Fine 0.004 0.005 -0.014 
   (0.109) (0.119) (0.094) 
Ln(Fine) 0.017 0.017 0.020 
 (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) 
Board Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Country Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Size FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 765 765 765 
Log-Likelihood -82.65*** -82.65*** -80.78*** 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.61 0.61 0.62 
 
The table reports the results from the probit model for the incidence of misconduct fine in year t. Gender 
diversity is proxied by the fraction of female directors on the board. Size Qi, i = 1, 2, 3, 4, represents banks in 
the ith quartile as grouped by asset value, where 1 stands for the top quartile. The interaction term Female 
Director % x Size Qi is the key variable defined as the percentage of female directors in the ith size quartile. 
Size FE denotes the size quartile indicators Size Qi. All independent variables are lagged by one year. 
Standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in parentheses. Board controls include board size, 
directors’ tenure and age, and CEO’s tenure, age, and turnover. Bank controls include bank size, profitability, 
stock return volatility, and Tobin’s Q. Country controls include gender index rank, GDP growth, and G10 
dummy variable. Agency FE stands for the type of agency that issues the fine. The Log-Likelihood statistic 
pertains to the null hypothesis that the model coefficients are jointly zero. ***, **, * denote significance at 
the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. Definitions of the variables are provided in Appendix B. 
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Appendix A: List of sampled sanctions and sanctioning regulatory agencies. 
 
Sanction type Sanction Sanctioning regulatory agency 
   
Banking business 
violations 
Banking violation Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) 
Federal Reserve 
New York State Department of Financial 
Services (NYSDFS) 
New York County District Attorney (NYCDA) 
Anti-money laundering deficiency Federal Reserve 
Justice Department Criminal Division 
New York State Department of Financial 
Services (NYSDFS) 
Fraud Justice Department Criminal Division 
Mortgage abuse US Attorney 
Justice Department multiagency referral 
Financial institution supervision 
failure 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
Investor protection violation Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 




Economic sanction violation Justice Department Criminal Division 
Office of Foreign Assets Control 
US Attorney 
New York State Department of Financial 
Services (NYSDFS) 
Federal Reserve 
Office of Foreign Assets Control 
US sanction violation Office of Foreign Assets Control 
  
Market violations Toxic securities abuse Federal Housing Finance Agency 
National Credit Union Administration 
US Attorney 
Justice Department Civil Division 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
Securities issuance or trading 
violation 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
Interest rate benchmark 
manipulation 
Justice Department Criminal Division 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
Federal Reserve 
Foreign exchange market 
manipulation 
Justice Department Criminal Division 
Federal Reserve 
Justice Department Antitrust Division 





Tax violation Justice Department Tax Division 
US Attorney 
Accounting fraud or deficiency Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
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Falsification of records of NY 
financial institutions 
New York County District Attorney (NYCDA) 
Data submission deficiency Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
False Claims Act Justice Department Civil Division 
US Attorney 
Consumer protection violation Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
Employment discrimination Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
Benefit plan administrator 
violation 
Employee Benefits Security Administration 
Wage and hour violation Labour Department Wage and Hour Division 
Workplace safety or health 
violation 
Occupational Safety & Health Administration 
Servicemembers Civil Relief Act Justice Department Civil Rights Division 
Environmental violation Environmental Protection Agency 
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Appendix B: Variable definitions. 
 
Variable  Definition Source 
 
Misconduct fines 
D.Fine Dummy variable equal to 1 if a bank has been 
fined in year t, and 0 otherwise 
Authors' calculation using Violation 
Tracker / Regulatory agency data 
N.Fine  Number of fines (total) in a bank year Authors' calculation using Violation 
Tracker / Regulatory agency data 
N.Fine_Banking Number of fines related to banking business 
violations 
Authors' calculation using Violation 
Tracker / Regulatory agency data 
N.Fine_Economic Number of fines related to economic sanction 
violations 
Authors' calculation using Violation 
Tracker / Regulatory agency data 
N.Fine_Market Number of fines related to market violations Authors' calculation using Violation 
Tracker / Regulatory agency data 
N.Fine_Admin Number of fines related to administrative 
violations 
Authors' calculation using Violation 
Tracker / Regulatory agency data 
Fine  Fine amount (total) in a bank-year ($) Violation Tracker / Regulatory agency 
websites 
Ln(Fine) Ln(1+Fine) Authors' calculation using Violation 
Tracker / Regulatory agency data 
Fine_Banking Amount of fines related to banking business 
violations ($) 
Authors' calculation using Violation 
Tracker / Regulatory agency data 
Fine_Economic Amount of fines related to economic sanction 
violations ($) 
Authors' calculation using Violation 
Tracker / Regulatory agency data 
Fine_Market Amount of fines related to market violations ($) Authors' calculation using Violation 
Tracker / Regulatory agency data 
Fine_Admin Amount of fines related to administrative 
violations ($) 
Authors' calculation using Violation 
Tracker / Regulatory agency data 
D.Fine_Criminal Dummy variable equal to 1 if a fine is 
addressed in a criminal court, and 0 otherwise 
Authors' calculation using Violation 
Tracker / Regulatory agency data 
D.Fine_Banking Dummy variable equal to 1 if a fine is related to 
banking business violations, and 0 otherwise 
Authors' calculation using Violation 
Tracker / Regulatory agency data 
D.Fine_Economic Dummy variable equal to 1 if a fine is related to 
economic sanction violations, and 0 otherwise 
Authors' calculation using Violation 
Tracker / Regulatory agency data 
D.Fine_Market Dummy variable equal to 1 if a fine is related to 
market violations, and 0 otherwise 
Authors' calculation using Violation 
Tracker / Regulatory agency data 
D.Fine_Admin Dummy variable equal to 1 if a fine is related to 
administrative violations, and 0 otherwise 
Authors' calculation using Violation 
Tracker / Regulatory agency data 
 
Corporate governance  
Female Director Dummy variable equal to 1 if the gender of at 
least one board director is female, and 0 
otherwise 
Authors' calculation using BoardEx data 
Female Director % Fraction of female directors on the board  Authors' calculation using BoardEx data 
∆ Female Director % Change in the fraction of female directors on 
the board 
Authors' calculation using BoardEx data 
Critical Mass Dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of 
female directors on the board is at least 3, and 0 
otherwise 
Authors' calculation using BoardEx data 
Female CEO Dummy variable equal to 1 if the gender of the 
chief executive officer (CEO) is female, and 0 
if male 
Authors' calculation using BoardEx data 
Female Chair Dummy variable equal to 1 if the gender of the 
chairperson of the board is female, and 0 if 
male 
Authors' calculation using BoardEx data 
Female Leader Dummy variable equal to 1 if the gender of the 
CEO and/or the chairperson / president (board 
leadership) is female, and 0 if male 
Authors' calculation using BoardEx data 
Board Size Size of the board (number of board directors) Authors' calculation using BoardEx data 
Ln(Board Size) Ln(Board Size)  
Director Tenure  Average board tenure (years) Authors' calculation using BoardEx data 
Ln(Director Tenure) Ln(Director Tenure) Authors' calculation using BoardEx data 
Director Age Average age of board directors (years) Authors' calculation using BoardEx data 
Ln(Director Age) Ln(Director Age)  
Director Age Diversity Coefficient of variation of directors' age = 
Standard deviation of directors’ age / Director 
Authors' calculation using BoardEx data 




CEO Tenure Tenure of the CEO (years) Authors' calculation using BoardEx data 
Ln(CEO Tenure) Ln(CEO Tenure) Authors' calculation using BoardEx data 
CEO Age Age of the CEO (years) Authors' calculation using BoardEx data 
Ln(CEO Age) Ln(CEO Age) Authors' calculation using BoardEx data 
CEO Turnover Dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO in year t 
is different from the CEO in year t-1, and 0 
otherwise 
Authors' calculation using BoardEx data 
Foreign Director % Fraction of foreign directors on the board Authors' calculation using BoardEx data 
Employee Representative %  Fraction of employees on the board Authors' calculation using BoardEx data 
   
Bank-specific controls 
Total Assets Total assets (euro) Orbis Bank Focus 
Size Ln(Total Assets) Authors' calculation using Orbis Bank 
Focus data 
ROE Return on equity Authors' calculation using Orbis Bank 
Focus data 
Stock Return Volatility Annualised standard deviation of daily stock 
returns (3-year moving average) 
Authors' calculation using Thomson Eikon 
data 
Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q = (Total assets – Equity + Market 
value of equity) / Total assets 
Authors' calculation using Orbis Bank 
Focus and Thomson Eikon data 
Ln(Tobin’s Q) Ln(Tobin’s Q) Authors' calculation using Orbis Bank 
Focus and Thomson Eikon data 
   
Size Qi Dummy variable equal to 1 if a bank’s size 
(total assets) falls into the 1st (top) quartile of 
the sample, and 0 otherwise 
Authors' calculation using Orbis Bank 
Size Q234 Dummy variable equal to 1 if a bank’s size 
(total assets) falls into the 2nd- 4th (bottom) 
quartiles of the sample, and 0 otherwise 
Authors' calculation using Orbis Bank 
Low Risk Bank Dummy variable equal to 1 if a bank’s average 
stock price volatility is below the 75th percentile 
of the sample, and 0 otherwise  
Authors' calculation using Orbis Bank 
High Risk Bank Dummy variable equal to 1 if a bank’s average 
stock price volatility is equal to or above the 
75th percentile of the sample, and 0 otherwise 
Authors' calculation using Orbis Bank 
   
Country-specific controls 
Gender Index Score Country gender gap index score  World Economic Forum Global Gender 
Gap Report 2018  
 
Gender Index Rank Country ranking based on Gender Index Score Authors’ calculations using the World 
Economic Forum Global Gender Gap 
Report 2018 
GDP Growth GDP real growth rate International Monetary Fund (IMF)  
G10 Dummy variable equal to 1 if a bank is 
headquartered in a G10 country, and 0 
otherwise 
Authors' calculation 
   






Appendix C: Correlation matrix. 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
  (1) Female Director % 1.00 
  (2) ∆ Female Director % 0.29* 1.00 
  (3) Female Leader 0.33* 0.01 1.00 
  (4) Ln(Board Size) -0.04 -0.03 0.06 1.00 
  (5) Ln(Director Tenure) 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.03 1.00 
  (6) Ln(Director Age) 0.02 -0.01 -0.13* 0.14* 0.34* 1.00 
  (7) Ln(CEO Tenure) -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 -0.05 0.44* 0.21* 1.00 
  (8) Ln(CEO Age) -0.06 -0.04 -0.13* 0.17* 0.24* 0.36* 0.38* 1.00 
  (9) CEO Turnover 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.03 -0.23* -0.12* -0.68* -0.18* 1.00 
  (10) Size 0.27* 0.04 0.19* 0.37* -0.06 0.23* -0.14* 0.08 0.03 1.00 
  (11) ROE 0.02 -0.09 -0.02 -0.20* 0.21* -0.19* 0.12* -0.18* -0.12* -0.21* 1.00 
  (12) Stock Return Volatility -0.18* -0.04 -0.04 0.08 -0.26* 0.03 -0.12* 0.02 0.08 0.22* -0.43* 1.00 
  (13) Ln(Tobin’s Q) -0.10* -0.05 -0.12* -0.20* -0.23* 0.07 0.01 -0.03 -0.03 0.09 -0.02 0.12* 1.00 
  (14) Gender Index Rank 0.44* 0.01 0.21* -0.13* 0.03 -0.12* 0.01 -0.14* -0.02 0.34* 0.17* -0.15* 0.01 1.00 
  (15) GDP Growth 0.16* 0.04 0.16* -0.13* 0.02 -0.07 -0.08 -0.18* 0.04 -0.07 0.28* -0.34* -0.03 0.12* 1.00 
  (16) G10 0.24* 0.12* -0.03 0.03 -0.21* 0.09* -0.22* -0.10* 0.06 0.32* -0.07 0.02 0.17* 0.26* -0.15* 1.00 
 
The table reports the correlation matrix for the variables used in the baseline regression analysis. * shows significance at the 1 percent level. Definitions of the variables are provided in 
Appendix B.   
 
 
